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CONTRACTING AROUND SECURITIES
LITIGATION: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE
SCOPE OF LITIGATION BYLAWS
Verity Winship*
HAREHOLDERS often sue the companies in which they hold
shares. They pursue fiduciary duty violations under state law or
claim rights under the federal securities laws. Shareholder litigation
is an area, in other words, where state and federal law interact and some-
times overlap. Recent legal developments have opened a new arena in
which state and federal regulation of shareholder claims collide. Begin-
ning in 2013, Delaware courts approved (with limits) the use of corporate
charter and bylaw provisions to set the rules for shareholder litigation.'
The use of these litigation provisions triggered heated discussion. Issues
about their use are embedded in broader debates over the value of share-
holder litigation, the role of private enforcement, the comparative power
of shareholders and directors, the role of Delaware in U.S. corporate law,
and other longstanding, polarized, and possibly intractable fights.
This essay pulls on one thread in the tangle of issues that these litiga-
tion provisions raise. It highlights a feature of these emerging provisions:
the gradual expansion of their claimed scope. Litigation bylaws and char-
ter provisions emerged in the form of exclusive forum selection clauses,
designating the state of incorporation for internal disputes governed by
state law. They covered fiduciary duty claims, for instance. What started
as a way to shape state-law litigation about corporate actors, however,
has expanded to reach all litigation between those actors, including fed-
eral securities litigation.
Legislative fixes to date have not resolved these questions about scope.
Delaware legislation passed in 2015 prohibits Delaware stock corpora-
tions from adopting bylaws or charter provisions that would shift fees in
connection with "internal corporate claims."'2 Whether internal claims in-
clude those based in federal securities law is open to debate. The statute
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litigation provisions going forward, see Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract,
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2575668.




is also limited in other respects: it addresses fee-shifting clauses in certain
businesses, but leaves unaffected all other types of litigation provisions,
their adoption by other business forms and their use outside of Delaware.
This essay outlines some reasons to be troubled by the expanding reach
of litigation provisions. It then proposes several ways that courts could
distinguish among these provisions based on their scope, with a prefer-
ence for those that focus on the core category of state-law corporate
governance.
I. THE EMERGENCE - AND EXPANSION - OF LITIGATION
PROVISIONS
This Part traces the emergence of the corporate bylaws and charter
provisions that determine how and where shareholder litigation takes
place.3 Throughout, it tracks one key feature of these litigation provi-
sions: the expanding territory that they claim within the vast and varied
landscape of shareholder litigation.
A. EXCLUSIVE FORUM SELECTION AND THE Focus ON STATE
CORPORATE LAW
The first type of litigation provision to be adopted by companies and to
be tested in court was the exclusive forum selection clause. These clauses,
included in corporate charters or bylaws, designated a particular court
(usually Delaware Chancery Court) as the only place that certain intra-
corporate disputes could be resolved. They created a connection between
the governing state law-usually the law of the state of incorporation-
and where disputes concerning that law would be decided.
A particular litigation pattern triggered the development of these
clauses. Plaintiffs' lawyers were challenging an increasing percentage of
corporate deals, bringing suits in state courts that alleged breaches of
state-law fiduciary duties. Some plaintiffs' firms filed suits covering the
same class and same conduct in a non-Delaware forum, often the head-
quarters state.4 The jurisdictional rules permitted this multi-forum filing;
nothing mandated that parties bring these suits only in the state of incor-
3. The terminology used to describe these provisions has not settled. This essay refers
to them as "litigation provisions," but they are also called "litigation-regulating" provi-
sions, or "Litigation Rights." See CORP. LAW COUNCIL, DELAWARE STATE BAR Ass'N,
FEE-SHIFTING FAQs, available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2015/03/COUN
CIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-FAQS-3-6-15-U0124511.docx; INST. S'HOLDER SERV., U.S.
SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 23-24 (2014), available at http://www.issgovern
ance.com/file/policy/2015ussummaryvotingguidelines.pdf.
4. Negotiation among plaintiffs' attorneys about fee allocation may have driven this
litigation. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
Shareholder Suits and its Application to Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
1753, 1753 (2012) (describing "fee distribution litigation" as "multijurisdictional suits ...
filed by plaintiffs' law firms largely to obtain a slice of the total pool of plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees that are paid in a global settlement").
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poration.5 Defendant corporations, however, were quite unhappy with
defending in multiple jurisdictions and with the possibility that they
would have to settle weaker cases in non-Delaware courts.
Commentators, attorneys and lawmakers floated several approaches to
consolidate litigation. 6 In an influential footnote, Vice Chancellor Laster
of the Delaware Chancery Court suggested a remedy: "[I]f boards of di-
rectors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an
efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corpora-
tions are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive
forum for intra-entity disputes."' 7 Defendant corporations-and their law-
yers and other advisors-took him up on the suggestion, and private or-
dering ultimately became the predominant approach to consolidating
multijurisdictional deal litigation.
These forum selection clauses were tested in Delaware Chancery Court
in Boilermakers v. Chevron.8 The court there found an exclusive forum
selection bylaw to be facially valid. According to the court, the bylaws
formed part of a flexible, multi-part contract between shareholders and
the corporation; shareholder corporate governance litigation was a
proper subject for bylaws under the Delaware code; and, like forum se-
lection clauses in other types of contracts, the bylaw was not prohibited
by law. 9 The clauses were accordingly permissible in Delaware absent im-
proper purpose or adoption. Since Boilermakers, most of the non-Dela-
ware courts asked to enforce an exclusive forum selection bylaw or
charter provision selecting Delaware courts have done so.10
Those are the origins of litigation provisions. The clauses solved what
some stakeholders thought was a problem; they consolidated litigation
while preserving court access. A key aspect of these clauses was their
limited scope. The most commonly adopted intracorporate forum selec-
tion bylaws and charter provisions reach state-law corporate governance
claims. Based on a study of intracorporate forum selection provisions,
more than 90% used the following language:
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an al-
ternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
5. See Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LIrIG. 51, 88 (2012) (noting that no rule limits these disputes to a particular
forum and that stakeholders who want such a limitation must bargain for it, either through
private contract or by convincing other government actors).
6. See id. at 55-62.
7. In re Revlon, Inc., S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
8. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch.
2013).
9. Id.
10. Compare Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (invalidat-
ing an exclusive forum bylaw selecting Delaware courts), with Hemg Inc. v. Aspen Univ.,
No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013) (enforcing an exclu-
sive forum clause in corporate organizational documents); Groen v. Safeway Inc., No. RG
14716641, 2014 WL 3405752, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2014) (same); Genoud v. Edgen
Grp., No. 625,244 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., East Baton Rouge, La., Jan. 17, 2014) (same); Miller
v. Beam Inc., No. 2014 CH 00932, at *1 (11. Ch. Mar. 5, 2014) (same).
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shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action as-
serting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director,
officer or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or
the Corporation's stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim aris-
ing pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, or (iv) any action assert-
ing a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. Any person or
entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of
capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of
and consented to the provisions of this Article."
Note that the covered suits are identified by their form: derivative suits
brought on behalf of the corporation. Or they are identified by the source
of law: fiduciary duty, the state corporate code or the internal affairs doc-
trine, which by definition covers claims about corporate governance cov-
ered by the law of the state of incorporation. The clauses did not reach
other litigation among corporate actors. In particular, they made no claim
to reach securities litigation by shareholders. 12
In other words, the predominant practice in this area reached only
state-law claims. Moreover, these clauses likely could not have reached
all types of securities litigation even if lawyers and corporations had
wanted to extend them. Contracting parties have a range of forum
choices, and can contract into or out of personal jurisdiction (the reach of
a court to a particular defendant based on that defendant's contacts with
the forum state). However, these clauses cannot create the power in a
court to hear a particular type of case (subject matter jurisdiction) where
none previously existed.13 Jurisdiction for claims under the 1934 Securi-
ties Exchange Act is exclusive in the federal courts.14 State courts cannot
hear these securities claims, and forum selection clause cannot change
11. Netsuite, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. VI § 8
(Nov. 29, 2011), available at http:// sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 117106/
000119312507255707/dex32.htm; Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-
Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 352,
380-81 (2012) (quoting this provision and noting that this version, which he drafted with
lawyers from Wilson Sonsini, had become the dominant form with identical or nearly iden-
tical language used in 91.9% of all clauses identified at the time of his study).
12. Some of the language might arguably reach actions in federal court that include
both derivative state law-claims and securities claims and could thus arguably qualify as
"any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty." See, e.g., Jessica M. Erickson,
Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IowA L. REV. 49, 99 (2011).
However, defendants in Boilermakers did not press that argument, focusing instead on the
state-law and state-court aspects. See Defendants' Opening Brief at 30-31, Boilermakers
Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013) (No. 7238-CS) (listing
four categories covered by the clause: derivative suits, fiduciary duty, internal affairs and
DGCL).
13. Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carni-
val Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 88 (1992) ("It is
quite clear that parties may not, by agreement, create subject matter jurisdiction in courts
of limited subject matter jurisdiction.").
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b) (2012); 6 ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWEN-
FELS ON SECURITIEs FRAUD § 10:1 (2d ed. 2015) (noting exclusive federal court jurisdiction
over 10b-5 and other '34 Act litigation).
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B. FEE-SHIFTING AND THE EXPANSION TO ALL SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION
What started as court approval of provisions that shape disputes over
state-law governance claims has since expanded. The second test of a liti-
gation provision was of a broadly worded fee-shifting provision in a case
involving both antitrust claims and state-law fiduciary duty claims.16 ATP
Tour (the ATP) was a Delaware non-stock corporation that operated a
men's tennis tour. In the course of reorganizing the tour, the board
adopted several bylaws, including a fee-shifting bylaw:
In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or any-
one on their behalf ("Claiming Party")] initiates or asserts any [claim
or counterclaim ("Claim")] or joins, offers substantial assistance to
or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the League or
any member or Owner (including any Claim purportedly filed on be-
half of the League or any member), and (ii) the Claiming Party (or
the third party that received substantial assistance from the Claiming
Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial
interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially
achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each
Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse
the League and any such member or Owners for all fees, costs and
expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to,
all reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses) (collec-
tively, "Litigation Costs") that the parties may incur in connection
with such Claim. 1
7
Members sued the ATP to challenge certain changes to the tour, but
lost on all claims.1 8 The ATP then sought to recover fees from plaintiffs,
pointing to the fee-shifting bylaw. 19 A Delaware federal court certified
the question of the bylaw's validity to the Delaware Supreme Court.
20
The Delaware Court's response was succinct: the bylaw was facially
15. See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, No. 85 CIV. 4064, 1985 WL 2257, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
8, 1985) (enforcing an exclusive forum provision designating a state court for '33 Act
claims, for which the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction, while retaining
the '34 Act claims because jurisdiction was exclusive in the federal courts); 6 BROMBERG
ET AL., supra note 14, § 10:1 ("A forum selection clause in the parties' agreement specify-
ing exclusive jurisdiction in a state court does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction
over 10b-5 and other 1934 Act claims which cannot be brought in state court.").
16. Complaint, at 111, Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 2007 WL 4425678
(D. Del. Mar. 28, 2007) (No. 07CV00178) ((Count IV (Sherman Act); Count VII (fiduciary
duties); Count VIII (tortious interference with contractual and business interests)).
17. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App'x 124, 126 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Article 23 of the Amended and Restated Bylaws of ATP Tour, Inc.).
18. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 841 (3d Cir. 2010).
19. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., CIVA 07-178, 2009 WL 3367041, at *1
(D. Del. Oct. 19, 2009), vacated, 480 F. App'x 124 (3d Cir. 2012).
20. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., CV 07-178, 2013 WL 4478033, at *1 (D.
Del. Aug. 20, 2013).
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valid. 21 No law forbade its adoption. 22 Moreover, "[a] bylaw that allo-
cates risk among parties in intra-corporate litigation would also appear to
satisfy" the requirements in § 109(b) that a bylaw "relat[e] to the business
of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or
the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employ-
ees. ' 23 Finally, deterring litigation was not by itself an improper pur-
pose.24 The Court noted that the opinion reached only facial validity; it
did not judge whether the bylaw had been adopted "by the appropriate
corporate procedures and for a proper corporate purpose"-both re-
quirements for enforcing such a bylaw.25
Fee-shifting clauses adopted since A TP Tour have been broadly
worded, reaching other shareholder litigation, including that based in the
federal securities laws. Some reach all shareholder claims against the
company 26 or "any claim or counterclaim ... against the Company and/or
any Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate" 27 Others specifically define
covered "internal matter[s]" to include both state corporate law claims
and federal securities suits. 28 In addition to the language of these clauses,
other evidence suggests that their intended reach was expansive. For in-
stance, counsel for a corporation that had adopted a fee-shifting bylaw
explicitly said that it had been prompted by a securities class action.29
In sum, a key development from Boilermakers to A TP Tour and from
forum selection to fee-shifting was an expansion beyond the core compe-
tency of state corporate law to broad provisions reaching all sorts of
shareholder litigation.
21. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 554 (Del. 2014).
22. Id. at 557-58.
23. Id. at 558; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §109(b) (2015).
24. 91 A.3d 554, 559.
25. Id.
26. Amended and Restated Memorandum and Articles of Association of Alibaba
Group Holding Limited, § 173, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1577552/000119312514333674/ d709111dex32.htm.
27. See, e.g., The LGL Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 17, 2014) (covering
"any claim or counterclaim ... against the Company and/or any Director, Officer, Em-
ployee or Affiliate").
28. Hemispherx Biopharma, Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 10, 2014) (defining cov-
ered "Internal Matter" as "(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of or
in the right of the Company, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by any director, officer or other employee of the Company to the Company or the
Company's security holders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provi-
sion of the Delaware General Corporation Law, (iv) any action asserting a claim arising
pursuant to any provision of the federal securities laws, and any regulation promulgated
pursuant thereto, or (v) any action asserting a claim governed by what is known as the
internal affairs doctrine"); see also Smart & Final Stores Registration Statement (2014)
(applying a fee-shifting provision to "any current or prior stockholder or anyone on their
behalf' who initiated "any action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administra-
tive or investigative or asserts any claim or counterclaim" against the corporation or its
officers, directors, etc.).
29. Transcript of Scheduling Conference and Discussion Concerning Amendment of
Bylaw at 23, Kastis v. Hemispherx Biopharma, No. 8657-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2014) ("I
think [plaintiffs] will find out [from discovery] that there's securities litigation in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania which is really the central reason for adoption of the bylaw.").
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II. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF LITIGATION PROVISIONS
This last section takes up two questions about limiting the scope of
litigation provisions: why should they be limited, and how could courts
implement this limit?
Why restrict the scope of these litigation provisions in corporate bylaws
and charters to core state law claims? One underlying rationale for mak-
ing these distinctions is based on the source and structure of the legal
claims. I argue elsewhere that a key concern when addressing litigation
bylaws and charter provisions should be preventing backdoor waiver of
substantive law provisions. 30 For instance, if a charter or bylaws could not
eliminate duty of loyalty obligations directly, they should not be able to
do so indirectly by eliminating all enforcement of these duties.31 Because
substantive state corporate law is often enabling rather than mandatory,
it lends itself to experimentation with litigation provisions.32 Securities
law is different, however, with many more mandatory substantive
terms. 33 If the main concern is preventing waiver of mandatory provi-
sions, litigation provisions should be similarly limited.
34
Making these distinctions is also prudent for the adopting boards, as
some existing legal advice suggests.35 Uncertainty is inherent in adopting
clauses with a broad scope. Shareholder reaction (and the reaction of the
proxy advisory firms) is a concern regardless of the provision's scope, but
reaching beyond state corporate governance raises at least two particular
issues. First, the courts have not answered whether federal law preempts
fee-shifting provisions and other litigation provisions. In A TP Tour itself,
the federal court was faced with the question whether federal antitrust
laws preempted the fee-shifting bylaw. Rather than answer, it certified
questions about the bylaw's validity to the state court. It left the preemp-
tion question open. As some commentary suggests, preemption in this
context, whether by antitrust or by the securities laws, is not subject to
easy analysis.36
Second, the enforceability of litigation provisions is in flux, but litiga-
tion provisions limited to state-law corporate governance are more stable
than more expansive versions. That is because litigation provisions can be
paired with exclusive forum selection, as several examples (including the





35. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen & Stephen P. Lamb, Adopting and Enforcing Effective
Forum Selection Provisions in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, PAUL WEISS (Jan. 8, 2015),
available at http://www.paulweiss.com/media/2756381/fsc..article.pdf (recommending that
"[a]n effective, enforceable forum selection clause should be drafted to apply only to dis-
putes arising out of the company's governance and internal affairs, of the sort governed by
the law of the state in which the company is incorporated").
36. John C. Coffee, Jr., Testimony before SEC Investor Advisory Committee: "Fee-
Shifting Bylaws: Can They Apply in Federal Court? - The Case for Preemption" (Oct. 9,




bylaws adopted by the ATP) suggest. 37 The effect is that state-law corpo-
rate governance actions that fall within the scope of the exclusive forum
clauses would be decided in Delaware courts, where the law about the
validity of litigation provisions is (at least slightly) more developed. In
contrast, a litigation provision that reaches securities litigation would not
be within an exclusive forum clause and would not be restricted to the
Delaware court.
Limiting the reach of litigation provisions at least along these lines38 is
also prudent for courts, particularly Delaware courts. In part, to do other-
wise may invite action by the SEC. In the 1990s and again in 2012, the
SEC rejected arbitration clauses in articles of incorporation included in
registration statements.39 Broadly worded litigation provisions could
meet the same fate. The SEC's approach to arbitration provisions and
Delaware's approach to litigation provisions sometimes seem to be run-
ning in parallel, without ever meeting. Expansive scope might force them
to converge. Federal regulation or legislation is another possibility, partic-
ularly if Delaware courts enforce expansive provisions. Indeed, the draft-
ers of the Delaware legislation acknowledged just this risk in urging the
state legislature to act: to permit fee-shifting that would undermine fidu-
ciary duties might make other regulators "feel compelled to step in."'40
How could courts distinguish between (permissible and possibly desira-
ble) provisions limited to state corporate law claims, on the one hand,
and limits on federal securities law claims and other shareholder litiga-
tion, on the other? The first suggestion has to do with litigation bylaws in
particular, and that is to continue down a path taken by Boilermakers.41
The permissible role of bylaws is governed by §109(b) of the Delaware
corporate code: bylaws of a corporation "may contain any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to
the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or
powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees. '42 In Boilermakers, Delaware Chancery Court found the ex-
clusive forum bylaw valid in part because it "only regulate[d] suits
brought by stockholders as stockholders in cases governed by the internal
37. Winship, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20-21) (giving examples of bundled
provisions).
38. The limit to state corporate governance is not necessarily the only basis for limiting
these provisions. Id. (manuscript at 34-39) (suggesting other limits, especially on provi-
sions that functionally waive substantive rights).
39. Miles Weiss et al., Carlyle Drops Class-Action Lawsuit Ban as Opposition Mounts,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/carlyle-drops-
class-action-lawsuit-ban.html (noting that the SEC refused to accelerate a registration
statement that contained an arbitration clause and reporting that an SEC spokesperson
said that "'[w]e advised [Carlyle] that the staff was not prepared to clear the filing with the
mandatory-arbitration provision included"').
40. Explanation of Council Legislative Proposal, at 6, available at http://www.dela
warelitigation.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-
PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.docx.at 6.
41. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch.
2013).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015).
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affairs doctrine" so "plainly relate[d]" to the "'business of the corpora-
tion[s],' the 'conduct of [their] affairs,' and regulate[d] the 'rights or pow-
ers of [their] stockholders. ''43 It fit because it clearly concerned state
corporate internal affairs. Courts could extend this reasoning, considering
this to be an outer limit rather than just a safe harbor.44
The bylaw in A TP Tour was more expansive than that in Boilermakers,
as noted above. Because the underlying action involved antitrust claims
as well as state law fiduciary duty claims, one could read the opinion to
validate the use of fee-shifting clauses in the context of shareholders' fed-
eral claims. Some grounds exist for distinguishing ATP Tour, however.
The ATP Tour court described its holding precisely: "[F]ee-shifting provi-
sions in a non-stock corporation's bylaws can be valid and enforceable
under Delaware law."'45 Although the decision's application to for-profit
corporations has been widely assumed, the Delaware Supreme Court has
not decided this issue, so these grounds might broadly distinguish it.46
What was permissible in non-stock corporations could be impermissible
in the context of stock corporations. This approach would not require the
litigation bylaw to be struck down altogether. The court could instead
preserve its valid aspects, construing it against a background limit on
scope.47
A TP Tour may be further distinguished by its procedural posture. The
Delaware court was responding to a certified question from a federal
court, so could consider only the facial validity of the provision as a mat-
ter of law. 48 The court was disabled from making finer distinctions be-
tween, for instance, fees in the underlying action relating to federal
antitrust claims versus those relating to fiduciary duty violations. 49
Objections to bylaw provisions may simply provide a reason to locate
litigation provisions in articles of incorporation instead. For provisions in
corporate charters, courts could implement this limit on scope by refining
their analysis of how bylaws and charters function as contracts. If corpo-
rate bylaws and charters are deemed components of an intracorporate
contract, what is the scope of that contract? Are they contracts about the
shareholder as a "holder of corporate stock and a constituent of the cor-
porate entity" but not about the shareholder as a "purchaser or seller," as
43. 73 A.3d at 939.
44. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Norman M. Monhait, Fee-Shifting Bylaws: A
Study in Federalism, available at http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/2015/06/29/fee-shift
ing-bylaws-a-study-in-federalism/#sthash.WTx3qqji.DdHzNsXF.dpbs.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Henry duPont Ridgely, The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate Governance,
adapted from the Keynote Address at the SMU Corporate Counsel Symposium, at 19 (Oc-
tober 31, 2014) (making the point that A TP Tour's application to for-profit companies is
an open question), available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2014/11The-
Emerging-Role of.Bylaws-in-CorporateGovernance-copy.pdf.
47. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) ("[Bylaws] are pre-
sumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the
law rather than strike down the bylaws.").
48. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 2013 WL 4478033, at *4.
49. Hamermesh & Monhait, supra note 44.
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one commentator has suggested?50 If so, contracting about federal secur-
ities litigation is beyond their scope. This view finds some support in a
recent opinion by Vice Chancellor Laster, in which he categorized a 10b-5
claim under the federal securities law as "a personal claim akin to a tort
claim for fraud," which was "not a property right associated with
shares. "51
Questions about the contractual scope could also be framed as the in-
terpretation of § 102, which defines the contents of the certification of
incorporation. 52 Corporations may include "[a]ny provision for the man-
agement of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corpora-
tion, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the
powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any
class of the stockholders ... if such provisions are not contrary to the laws
of this State. ' ' 53 The "powers" would be powers related to the internal
relations and corporate governance that are the traditional realm of state
corporate law.
Determining the scope of the contract is not necessarily the end of the
inquiry. Contractual terms sometimes reach extra-contractual (but re-
lated) claims. In other contractual settings, for instance, courts have inter-
preted when a fee-shifting or other litigation provision covers not only
breach of contract, but related torts or statutory claims. 54 In these circum-
stances, courts generally focus on the intent of the contracting parties to
determine the provision's scope.55 Intent is complicated in the context of
corporate charters and bylaws. No one claims that shareholders have ex-
pressly agreed to negotiated terms. Instead, shareholders are deemed to
consent because they are bound by a vote of the majority of shareholders,
because they have agreed to a particular governance structure that al-
lowed directors to introduce bylaws ("contractual terms") unilaterally,56
50. Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corpo-
rate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (noting that "American law
distinguishes between the contract that governs the transfer of a security between buyer
and seller, and the 'contract' that forms the corporation and allocates power between its
managers and shareholders"), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2572014; see also Bar-
bara Black, Eliminating Securities Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 802, 838 n.172 (noting limits to the scope of provisions that govern shareholders'
ownership rights).
51. In re Activision Blizzard Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 8885-VCL (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2015), slip op. at 50.
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2015).
53. Id.
54. PRACTICAL LAW COMMERCIAL, CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM: KEY
ISSUES, Practical Law Practice Note 7-509-6876 (2015) (noting that parties to a contractual
forum selection provision must "consider whether the clause conveys jurisdiction on the
selected forum to adjudicate extra-contractual matters" and that parties "parties typically
try to capture extra-contractual matters by including language in the choice of forum clause
that expands its scope to include tort, fraud, statutory and equitable claims").
55. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3803.1
(4th ed. 2015) ("Courts are governed by the intent of the parties and tend to conclude that
a contract-based clause will apply to torts that arise from the contractual relationship.").
56. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 940
(Del. Ch. 2013) ("[B]ylaws, together with the certificate of incorporation and the broader
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or because they bought shares with the knowledge of a particular provi-
sion.57 So what is their "intent" about the scope of the provision? Explicit
language matters. But courts might also consider shareholder expecta-
tions when agreeing to the governance structure, and that expectation
might reasonably be limited to the type of contracting over internal cor-
porate governance that is the central subject of the intracorporate
bargain.
In the context of fee-shifting provisions, recent Delaware legislation
provides another possible way to limit the scope of litigation provisions.
The statute eliminated certain categories of fee-shifting in Delaware for-
profit stock companies.58 As noted above, the legislation applies to "in-
ternal corporate claims." Ambiguities in the statutory language have led
to a debate about its scope. Is a claim of securities fraud an internal cor-
porate claim? Some, including those involved in drafting the initial legis-
lation, say that the statute does not apply to federal securities claims
because the duties breached, especially under 10b-5, "do not arise from a
director or officer's duty to the corporation or its stockholders." 59 Others
say yes, pointing out that the statute fails to limit coverage to claims
under Delaware law and uses phrases such as "including claims in the
right of the corporation. '60 At least when a fee-shifting provision is at
issue, a court may have some room to read the new statutory provisions
as prohibiting fee-shifting clauses that apply to certain federal securities
actions.
The final way for a court to cabin these provisions would be to do so
when it reviews how and why a particular provision was adopted. As the
Delaware courts have suggested, the backstop for the court's evaluation
of these clauses is the "as-applied" test that looks to whether such provi-
sions were adopted inequitably. 6' This solution is partial: reaching this
stage of litigation may be costly, particularly in the context of fee-shifting,
which may discourage plaintiffs from pursuing an initial challenge. But a
court might consider prevention of federal securities litigation to be an
DGCL, form part of a flexible contract between corporations and stockholders, in the
sense that the certificate of incorporation may authorize the board to amend the bylaws'
terms and that stockholders who invest in such corporations assent to be bound by board-
adopted bylaws when they buy stock in those corporations.").
57. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 Bus. LAw. 161, 161-62
(2014).
58. Del. S. Bill 75.
59. Hamermesh & Monhait, supra note 44; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., What Happens
Next?, Bank & Corporate Governance Law Reporter, available at http://www.lawreporters
.com/junl5b&c.pdf (arguing that the Delaware legislation, "read strictly, permits fee-shift-
ing bylaws that apply to federal securities, antitrust and fraud actions").
60. Neil J. Cohen, Does Delaware Bill 75 Cover Fee Shifting in Securities Cases?,
Bank & Corporate Governance Law Reporter, available at http://www.lawreporters.com/
junl5b&c.pdf.
61. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ("[I]nequitable
action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible."); Winship, supra
note 1, (manuscript at 53) (pointing out that Delaware courts consider equitable evaluation
an important shareholder protection).
2015]
924 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
inequitable purpose under this test, particularly given shareholder's ex-
pectations about the scope of the intracorporate contract.
III. CONCLUSION
The emergence of litigation provisions has put pressure on the split
between the federal and state domain over shareholder litigation. As
broadly worded clauses are introduced and tested in court, they challenge
and sometimes stretch assumptions about the proper subject matter for
these intracorporate bargains. This essay proposes that courts distinguish
among these litigation provisions based on whether they reach state cor-
porate governance claims or other types of shareholder litigation, includ-
ing securities litigation, with an eye to limiting these clauses to the core
category of state-law corporate governance.
